A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games.
INTRODUCTION
For a game in extensive form with perfect recall Selten [3J introduced the concept of perfect equilibrium points in order to exclude the possibility that disequilibrium behavior is prescribed at unreached parts of the game.
Selten achieves this equilibrium behavior in the following way: it is assumed that any player will make mistakes with a small probability; therefore every player will make any choice with a positive probability and hence any part of the game will be reached with a positive probability. So, in such a "perturbed game" there are no unreached parts and therefore every player will make an equilibrium choice everywhere. A perfect equilibrium point is then defined as an equilibrium point, which can be obtained as the limit of a sequence of equilibrium points, associated with a sequence of perturbed games for which the mistake parameter goes to zero. Selten [3J proved that any finite game in extensive form with perfect recall has at least one perfect equilibrium point, so indeed the perfectness concept is a useful refinement of the equilibrium concept.
Selten [3J also introducedtheperfectness concept for finite games in normal form. However, the relation between perfect equilibrium points in extensive form games and perfect equilibrium points in normal form games, is not as nice as one (perhaps) would like it to be. Namely, let r be an n-person extensive game and let G be the normal form associated with r. Let be a behavior strategy combination and let q=(q1, ••. ,qn) be a mixed strategy combination such that the behavior strategy induced by q. is b. (section 2).Ĩ t can be proved that, if b is a perfect equilibrium point of r, then q is a perfect equilibrium point of G. However, if q is a perfect equilibrium point of G, then it is not necessarily true that b is a perfect equilibrium point of r. Selten [3J has given 2 examples of this phenomenon, which will be reviewed later on.
Myerson [2J has noted that perfect equilibrium points of normal form games possess another undesirable property. Namely,that adding strictly dominated strategies may change imperfect equilibrium points into perfect ones. Therefore, he introduced a refinement of the perfectness concept: the properness concept. Furthermore, he showed that any n-person game in normal form has at least one proper equilibrium point.
In this paper, we will relate perfect equilibrium points of a game in extensive form to proper equilibrium points of the associated normal form. We will prove, that proper equilibrium points of a normal form game induce very sensible strategies in the extensive form of this game.
Namely, if r is a finite game in extensive form, G the normal form associated with r and q a proper equilibrium point of G, then in a natural (but not standard) way q induces a behavior strategy combination b=(b1,
for which it can be proved, that for any player i:
if b. prescribes that a certain choice must be taken with a positive probability, then, given that player i will play b. after c, c is a best replỹ against a sequence of small perturbations of (b1,···,b i _ 1 , b i + 1 ,···, b n ) So, the main result of this paper, which is proved in section 4, says:
if a player plays (in the extensive form) in accordance with a proper equilibrium point of the normal form, then he acts optimally against mistakes of the other players, against past mistakes of himself, but not necessarily against future mistakes of himself. In section 3 we will review the discrepancy between perfect equilibrium points of games in extensive form and perfect equilibrium points of games in normal form. The examples given in this section will illustrate that the result of section 4 is the best we can obtain: we cannot expect that a choice prescribed by a proper equilibrium point is a best reply against mistakes of the player himself. Throughout the paper, the notation used will be the same as in Selten [3J. Below, some definitions with respect to a finite game r in extensive form with perfect recall are given.
Let u be an information set of player i in the game r.
A local strategy biu at the information set u is a probability distribution Let r be an n-person extensive game with perfect recall and let G be the normal form associated with r. Let q be a proper equilibrium point of G and let {q€k}kE:N be a sequence of €k-proper equilibrium points, such that lim E: k = a and lim qE:k = q. Let b£k be the behavior strategy combination k-+oo k-+oo induced qy q€k (k€:N). In section 4 we are interested in behavior strategy combinations, which are limits of such a_sequence {bE:k}k€JN'
We will call a limit of such a sequence a limit behavior strategy combination induced by q. Note that there is a difference between behavior strategies induced by q and limit behavior strategies induced by q (see e.g.
example 2).
Remarks:
1. The definition of perfect equilibrium points for normal form games is somewhat different from the definition given in Selten [3] We have chosen for the equivalent definition, given by Myerson [2] 2. If G is a game in normal form, a < €1 < E: 2 and q is an E: 1 -perfect equilibrium point of G, then q is also an E: 2 -perfect equilibrium point of G. Therefore,it is necessary that:
And of course for all € > 0, one can choose e 1 , e 2 and n in such a way that (3.1) is satisfied. However, such a choice induces irrational behavior in the extensive form.
Namely, in the language of the extensive form, (3.1) says:
if b~u is the local strategy at u 2 induce~by q~, and 2 if b~is the behavior strategy induced by q~, then
But this implies (since lim b~(L3) = 0) that player 1 must choose Q, with a €-+O probability, which is greater than O. However, this is certainly not the case: since player 1 expects player 3 to play R 3 he will play r (with probability 1). The only perfect equilibrium point in the extensive form is the equilibrium point (R 1 2, R 2 ). This point is perfect in the normal form, too.
However, since in the normal form R 1 r is a duplicate of R 1 2, the point (R 1 r, R 2 ) is also a perfect equilibrium point in the normal form. This point that induces disequilibrium behavior at the information set u 2 (which is not relevant when (R 1 r, R 2 ) is played). However, equilibrium behavior at this information set can be obtained by considering limit behavior strategies, induced by (R 1 r, R 2 ).
Namely, for € > 0 let q€ be an E-proper equilibrium point, such that lim q€ = q.
Let b i be the behavior strategy induced by qi (i € {1,2}, € > 0). Hence, the sequence (b l , b 2 ) E>O has a unique limit, which is (Rl~' R 2 ), the unique perfect equilibrium point of r. In section 4 we will show, that a choice prescribed by a limit behavior strategy combination, induced by a proper equilibrium point, is always an almost best reply against a sequence of perturbations, converging to this limit behavior strategy combination.
THE THEOREM
We open this section by giving an alternative characterization of perfect equilibrium points in extensive games (cf.
[3], theorem 7). In the sequel we will use the concept of local best replies.
Let b be a completely randomized behavior strategy combination. Let u € U., 
Then lim nk(c) = 0 for all c and hence the perturbed game (f,n k ) is well k-+oo defined if k is sufficiently large (say k~k O ). For k~k O we have: 
4.4)
It is easily seen, that there also exists a pure strategy (4.4). In the sequel we will assume, that b~e) is pure.
J. ,
Since the game has perfect recall, we have that, if b is b~E) that satisfies a behavior strategy combination such that u is reached with a positive probability, then , , Hiu(b Ic) is independent of that part of b i that comes before u (see [3J lemma 4) Therefore, if~is a pure strategy, such that~E Ess(c), then it follows from (4.4)
From (4.5) we see that there exists a pure strategy~which is a better re-I -. t bE: th Then b is an almost perfect equilibrium point of r.
Proof
Using that the game is finite and applying lemma 2 repeatedly, we see that we can construct a sequence {(€k' qk, bk)}kE~With the following properties: u Since the game is finite, the order of every information set is finite and the proof of (4.17) is complete. Recalling the definition of almost perfect equilibrium points, we see that we have proved the theorem.
IJ

Remark
The converse of the theorem above is false in general: if b is a perfect equilibrium point of the extensive form, then there does not necessarily exist a proper equilibrium point q of the normal form, such that b is induced by q. Namely, Myerson [2J has given an example of a normal form game G with a perfect equilibrium point q, that is not proper. The game G can also be viewed as an extensive game r, where each player has one information set. Then q is a perfect equilibrium point of r and q is not induced by a proper equilibrium point of G. The search for a concept for extensive form games that corresponds precisely to the concept of proper equilibrium points for normal~orm games, is a subject of current research.
